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ts scheme. In addition, we 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1 Introduction
Critics of o¤shoring are mainly concerned with the welfare e¤ects that these business
practices can have on the population at large, but especially on low-skill low-wage
workers. Active measures are usually called forth to palliate these negative e¤ects of
globalization, but sometimes the remedy might turn out to be worse than the disease.
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of the o¤shoring of low-skill activities,
while discussing di¤erent usual counter measures with diverging results. We evaluate
two particular policies that could potentially outweigh the e¤ects of o¤shoring, namely,
a change in the level of unemployment benets and a reduction of the vacancy costs
broadly understood here as the exibilization of the labor market.
The policies we have chosen for discussion have been proposed on both sides of the
political spectrum, and as with every other policy measure, they have been clumsily
tailored for political advantage only to deal with di¢ culties in a short-time horizon. It
is in this light that we aim at suggesting possible policy outcomes, while giving a word
of warning which calls for discretion in coping with the o¤shoring threat.1
Notice that, in focusing on the e¤ects of o¤shoring and its immediate political
reaction, we are emphasizing the interactions between trade and labor market policies
for a hypothetical equilibrium. In order to account for some of the welfare improving
e¤ects of o¤shoring e.g. the future recycling of low-skill workers and their increase in
productivity levels we will allow for an exogenous upgrading of low-skill workers that
can also be considered as a supplementary compensating mechanism to those o¤ered
by the proposed policies.
We build on the previous literature of matching models like Albrecht and Vroman
(2002), Rogerson et al. (2005), and Davidson et al. (2008). Albrecht and Vroman
(2002) propose a matching model with endogenous skill requirements where employers
create both high and low-skill vacancies and where the distribution of skill requirements
across these vacancies is endogenous. It is also assumed that a low-skill job can be done
by either type of worker whereas high-skill jobs can only be done by high-skill workers.
Unemployment is generated by frictions and the meeting process (undirected) is taken
from Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (2000), while the wage-setting
approach is of the Nash bargaining type. Low-skill workers are better o¤ the greater the
fraction of low-skill vacancies, while the opposite is true for high-skill workers. Likewise,
rms with low-skill requirements are better o¤ the greater the fraction of low-skill job
candidates.
We adapt and extend the model in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to the case of
low-skill o¤shoring, and then use di¤erent parameter combinations that render inter-
1For an interesting and intense debate on the welfare implications of o¤shoring see the Samuelson
Bhagwati exchange (Samuelson, 2004, and Bhagwati et al., 2004).
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esting comparative statics which can be used for policy recommendation analysis. In
particular, we will focus the discussion on the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring for low-skill
workers and the potential compensating mechanisms. As important as the welfare of
those directly a¤ected by o¤shoring is, special attention must also be paid to the fund-
ing limitations that such compensating policies involve. For that reason, we extend the
model as to account for the government nancing of such policies, and then compare
the alternative welfare outcomes produced by each of the alternatives. The objective is,
when possible, to bring up the welfare of low-skill workers back to pre-o¤shoring levels.
In the context of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), two equilibria will be discussed: the
equilibrium with cross-skill matching (CSM) and the equilibrium with ex post segmen-
tation (EPS). CSM occurs when high-skill workers and low-skill vacancies are matched,
whereas EPS takes place when these potential matches do not meet (e.g. high-skill
workers only work in high-skill jobs). Changing the models parameters yields three
scenarios: (i) a change from a CSM equilibrium to another; (ii) a switch from a CSM to
an EPS equilibrium; and (iii) a change from an EPS equilibrium to another. These dif-
ferent scenarios, in combination with the policy measures, will produce di¤erent welfare
e¤ects.
The o¤shoring literature has seen a recent surge in welfare analysis. For example,
Mitra and Ranjan (2013) suggest that a reduction in the cost of o¤shoring increases
o¤shoring and the unemployment of unskilled workers, but has a positive e¤ect on
skilled workers in the form of higher wages and lower unemployment. Ranjan (2013a)
argues that some employment protection policies can play an important role in protect-
ing workers against external shocks like o¤shoring. He concludes that o¤shoring can
reduce welfare even in the presence of optimal severance payments, and that some ad-
ditional redistribution program might be needed to ensure welfare gains. He also points
out that employment protection in the form of administrative cost of ring fails to pro-
tect workers as it unambiguously reduces welfare. On the same line, Ranjan (2013b)
suggests that when unemployment arises due to both job destruction and matching
frictions, a combination of severance payments and unemployment benets is a better
policy to shield workers from o¤shoring than either of them alone. Jung and Mercenier
(2014), in turn, analytically derive the conditions under which all workers, including
low-skill, might gain from the surge of o¤shoring. Their main policy implication is
that government action should aim at reducing market rigidities, rather than thwarting
adjustment, something that calls, for instance, for extensive and exible re-training
programs.
It must be observed that o¤shoring indicators are not easy to come by, and that in-
direct indicators seem to be the best choice. For that reason we rely on an intermediate
imports index, as originally proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). Arguably, the
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higher the volume of intermediate trade the higher the o¤shoring intensity. The ratio-
nale goes as follows: as soon as relocatedbusiness units start operating from abroad,
the intensity of intrarm trade, which mostly consists of parts, components, and other
inputs previously produced in the home country, will grow substantially. Firms are thus
responding to import competition from low-wage countries by moving their non-skill
intensive activities to foreign locations from which they can later import back.
In order to produce a fair measure of low-skill o¤shoring, we restrict our o¤shoring
index to the inputs originated in the manufacturing sector of the foreign country. As
a result, we are able to determine the intensity of the o¤shoring of material inputs
(or low-skill o¤shoring) as opposed to that of services which is usually in the higher
end of the skill ladder. According to our numbers, the o¤shoring of relatively low-skill
materials-related activities turns out to be consistently higher than that of services
for the group of countries considered.2 Moreover, beyond what we get from the data,
rm theory holds that it is lower-skill activities that become redundant earlier and are
thus at risk of being relocated rst. Unlike Davidson et al. (2008) and Arseneau and
Epstein (2014), we start from this hypothesis to lay out our model below and carry out
our welfare analysis that is, low-skill o¤shoring is signicantly more prominent than
high-skill and, consequently, deserving of more attention in terms of welfare e¤ects.3
To get an idea of the signicance of low-skill o¤shoring we calculate the indices for a
group of highly developed countries, before laying out the model in full in the following
sections.4 For the purpose of calibrating our model we use German data, given that,
as it clearly stands out in Figure 1, Germany is at the forefront of low-skill o¤shoring
practices while still having an important share of workers falling into the low and mid-
skill categories. Figures 1ac show the recent evolution of materials-based low-skill
o¤shoring (vertical axis) along with the evolution of the skill share (horizontal axis).
We use data on seven of the largest economies, with the size of the bubble indicating
the countrys GDP weight. Notice that unlike other countries Germany displays an
unambiguous upward trend of low-skill o¤shoring (Figures 1ac) and, at the same time,
remains very high among the countries with a signicant pool of low and mid-skill level
workers this is clearly seen in Figure 1c, where Germany is positioned very high and
to the right. Low-skill o¤shoring is likely to become a real issue in the near future,
especially in places like Germany where the share of low to mid skill level workers is,
even when decreasing, still non-trivial.
2Numerical details on the services o¤shoring measure are not presented here for reasons of space
but are available on request.
3Low-skill or blue collaro¤shoring is also more prominent in the literature see for instance Jung
and Mercenier (2014) for a recent study.
4This group of developed countries include: the US, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy,
and Spain.
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Figure 1: O¤shoring trends and skill shares, 5-year averages
(a) Mid-1990s (b) Early-2000s
(c) Mid-2000s
Sources: for o¤shoring index (vertical axis) is OECD Input-Output Database (2012), for skill levels (horizontal axis)
is OECD Education GPS, Chapter A (2012), and for GDP shares (bubbles) is economywatch.com and IMF (2015).
Note: low-skill is below upper secondary level, mid is secondary and post-secondary, and high is tertiary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model, its main properties,
and the possible types of equilibria are discussed in section 2. We briey outline the
strategy for the solution of the model in section 3. The welfare e¤ects of the proposed
policies as well as the additional exercise on skill upgrading are studied in section 4.
Final remarks are summarized in section 5.
2 Model
We adapt the model in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to account for the welfare e¤ects
of o¤shoring.5 We also extend the model by introducing the public sector in response
to the nancing of the proposed compensation policies. In short, our model considers
three types of agents: workers, rms, and the government.
Workers are innitely lived and of measure one. An exogenous fraction q of these
workers is low-skill, L; and the rest are high-skill, H: A worker of type i; i = L or H;
5A description of how the model works for one type of worker can be found in Rogerson et al.
(2005) and Williamson (2010).
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searching for a job, seeks to maximize the expected lifetime discounted utility function
E
1X
t=0
txit
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor and xit is consumption of type i at time
t:Consumption is equal to the expected net income in each period, so saving is not
possible.
There is free entry for rms and each rm employs one worker when active. A
vacancy can be opened at an exogenous cost c, and rms place vacancies of both skill
types. A fraction  of vacancies is low-skill and a fraction 1   is high-skill and their
distribution is endogenous. A rm of type i; i = L orH; maximizes its expected lifetime
discounted prots
E
1X
t=0
tit
where it are prots obtained by a rm of type i at time t: Further, if a rm hires a
worker to occupy a low-skill vacancy the level of output is yL, if it hires a worker to ll
a high-skill vacancy then the level of output is yH : High-skill rms are more productive
than their low-skill counterparts, thus yH > yL:
A high-skill worker is allowed to take both types of jobs, whereas a low-skill worker
can only ll a vacancy that corresponds to his type. If a worker of any type is employed,
he gets a wage corresponding to the type of vacancy and the type of skills he has. A
worker of type L (H) working in a job of type L (H) will get a wage wL (wH): A
worker of type H working in an L type job will get wL(H): Wages earned by high-skill
mismatched workers will be usually higher than wages of low-skill workers matched
correctly with a low-skill job, hence wH > wL(H) > wL:6 If a worker is unemployed he
is entitled to an exogenously given unemployment benet b, and any worker can refuse
the job if his reservation wage is not met. Moreover, jobs are lost at an exogenous rate
.
Firms and workers meet according to a matching technology M(u; v) where u rep-
resents unemployed workers (unemployment rate) and v vacancies. In this process an
endogenously determined fraction  of unemployed workers will be low-skill. In ad-
dition, arrival of jobs to workers happens at a rate M(u;v)
u
and arrival of workers to
employers at a rate M(u;v)
v
: If we dene market tightness as  = v
u
, we can rewrite the
job arrival rate to workers as m(1; v
u
) = m() and the workersarrival rate to rms as
M(u;v)
u
v
u
= m()

= z().
6In some particluar situations the market can collapse and only low-skill jobs will be o¤ered, i.e.
 = 1; and consequently all wages will converge to wL (see Albrech and Vroman, 2002, pp. 294 and
303).
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In our model, the government collects taxes from employed workers and transfers
all the revenues in the form of unemployment benets to idle workers. Depending on
the necessary funds for the unemployment package, an endogenous at tax rate  is
applied to all wages, balancing out the government budget constraint at all times.
If the match succeeds, the employed workers expected lifetime utility is Wi and the
active rms expected lifetime prots are Ji; i = L; H or L(H); where i = L stands for a
match between a low-skill worker and a low-technology rm, i = H is a match between
a high-skill worker and a high-technology rm, and i = L(H) is the case where a high-
skill worker matches with a low-skill rm. The workers utility stems from earning
the net wage (1  )wi; whereas the rms prots stem from the di¤erence between
production and incurred costs, to wit, wages and search, that is yi   wi   c:
Both workers and rms take into account that the match can be broken with proba-
bility : If the match does not succeed, an unemployed workers expected lifetime utility
is Uj and the expected lifetime prots of a vacant rm are Vj; j = L or H: In this case
the workers utility comes from earning the unemployment benets b, and the rms
(negative) prots come from nancing a vacancy,  c: Workers and rms assume that
a new match can occur for workers with a probability pWj and a new match can occur
for rms with a probability pFj .
We thus have that Wi stands for the value of working and Uj for the value of
unemployment, while Ji stands for the value of the job and Vj for the value of the
vacancy of the corresponding type. There is something to bargain over if the value
of working is higher than the value of unemployment, WH > UH ; WL(H) > UH and
WL > UL; and when the value of the job is higher than the value of the vacancy,
JH > VH ; JL(H) > VL and JL > VL: Wages are set to maximize the weighted surplus of
workers and rms in a Nash bargaining process
max
fwig
[Wi(wi)  Uj] [Ji(i)  Vj]1  (1)
where the weighting parameter  represents the bargaining power of workers.
In the case of a successful match the Bellman equations for employed workers and
active rms of type i; i = L; H or L(H); are
Wi =  [(1  )wi + Ui + (1  )Wi] ; (2)
Ji =  [i + Vi + (1  ) Ji] ; (3)
respectively. In the case of an unsuccessful match, the Bellman equations for unem-
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ployed workers and vacant rms of type i are
Ui = 

b+ pWi Wi +
 
1  pWi

Ui

; (4)
Vi = 
 c+ pFi Ji + (1  pFi )Vi ; (5)
respectively.
Bellman equations for the utility and prot maximization problems are written in
discrete time. In what follows we will rewrite them into the continuous form. In order
to do so, we take into account the relationship between the discount factor  and the
discount rate r;
 =
1
1 + r
: (6)
2.1 Steady State Equilibrium
Workers may experience spells of employment and unemployment. When the ow of
workers into and out of each employment state coincide the steady-state equilibrium is
achieved. In the steady state, low-skill workers that were working,
EL = q   u; (7)
and lose their jobs, equal the low-skill unemployed, q  EL; that nd a job (right hand
side)
EL = p
W
L (q   EL) (8)
and high-skill workers that were working,
EH = 1  q   (1  )u; (9)
and lose their jobs, equal the high-skill unemployed, 1  q   EH ; that nd a job (right
hand side)7
EH = p
W
H (1  q   EH) (10)
where pWL and p
W
H are the probabilities to nd a job for low and high-skill workers,
respectively.
In the described setup two types of equilibria may be realized: the equilibrium
with cross skill matching (CSM) and the equilibrium with ex post segmentation (EPS).
CSM occurs when high-skill workers and low-skill vacancies match, while EPS takes
place when these potential matches do not meet, i.e. high-skill workers only work in
7Remember that there are q low-skill workers in the labor force and  low-skill jobs being o¤ered.
Also, a fraction  of unemployed is low-skill, and high-skill workers can take both types of jobs and
both types of jobs meet workers at the same rate.
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high-skill jobs. The type of equilibria achieved depends on the expectations of high-skill
workers about the labor market and their willingness to accept a low-skill job.
2.1.1 Cross Skill Matching Equilibrium
Let us describe the equilibrium equations when high-skill workers are willing to take
low-skill jobs and low-skill rms can a¤ord to pay them.
The probability that a low-skill worker will match with a low-skill rm is
pWL = m(); (11)
and the probability that a high-skill worker will match with either a low or high-skill
rm is  
pWH
CSM
= m(): (12)
By rewriting (8) and (10), and using (7), (9), (11) and (12), we get the expressions
for the unemployment rate and the fraction of low-skill vacancies (as in Albrecht and
Vroman, 2002)
uCSM =
 (1  q)
m() (1  ) +  (1  ) ; (13)
CSM =
(1  ) qm() +  (q   )
m() (1  q) : (14)
Rewriting (2) and using (6) for each particular case, we obtain the equations that
characterize the match between low and high-skill workers with low and high-technology
rms
rWL = (1  )wL   (WL   UL); (15)
rWH = (1  )wH   (WH   UH); (16)
rWL(H) = (1  )wL(H)   

WL(H)   UH

(17)
where the discounted value of working must be equal to the ow of net income and the
expected loss from changing the employment status. Subscripts L and H characterize
low and high-skill workers, respectively, matched in the corresponding rms; and L(H)
stands for high-skill workers mismatched in low-skill jobs. Rewriting (4) and using (6)
we get the corresponding equations for unemployed workers
rUL = b+ m() (WL   UL) ; (18)
rUH = b+m()[WL(H) + (1  )WH   UH ] (19)
where the discounted value of being unemployed must be equal to the ow of income
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(unemployment benets) and the expected gain from nding a job. Rewriting (3) and
using (6), the Bellman equations for the active rms are
rJL = (yL   wL   c)   (JL   VL) ; (20)
rJH = (yH   wH   c)   (JH   VH) ; (21)
rJL(H) =

yL(H)   wL(H)   c
  [JL(H)   VL] (22)
where the discounted value of the job must be equal to the ow of prots earned by
the active rm and the expected loss from changing the labor market status (becoming
inactive). Rewriting (5) and using (6), we get the corresponding equations for the
inactive rms
rVL =  c+ z()

JL + (1  )JL(H)   VL

; (23)
rVH =  c+ z()(1  ) (JH   VH) (24)
where the discounted value of the vacancy must be equal to the ow of income lost
by maintaining the vacancy open and the expected gain from switching to the active
status. There is free entry into the market, and new rms enter while the value of the
vacancy is positive. No more rms enter as the value of the vacancy decreases to zero;
the free entry condition can be then expressed as
VL = 0 and VH = 0: (25)
Wages for each type of match can be obtained by processing (15)-(17), (20)-(22), and
(25), and by plugging them into (1) 8
wL = (yL   c) + 1 1  rUL; (26)
wH = (yH   c) + 1 1  rUH ; (27)
wL(H) = (yL   c) + 1 1  rUH : (28)
Notice that the wage of a mismatched worker, wL(H); is lower than the one of a correctly
matched high-skill worker, wH ; because of the formers lower productivity. Notice also
that the wage of a mismatched worker, wL(H); is higher than the wage of a correctly
matched low-skill worker, wL this is so because high-skill workers have better employ-
8Maximizing (1), one gets the following rst order condition
 W 0i (wi) [Ji(yi   wi   c)  Vi] + (1  ) J 0i(yi   wi   c) [Wi(wi)  Ui] = 0; i = L; L(H); H:
Using (15)-(17), (20)-(22) and their derivatives, together with the free entry condition (25), we get the
expressions for the corresponding wages.
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ment options if they become unemployed, and the rm must then compensate for this
fact.
The government taxes the wages of all employed workers at a at rate  ; and dis-
tributes all the revenues to the unemployed workers in the form of benets b;
ELwL + EHwL(H) +  (1  )EHwH = ub: (29)
The condition for the CSM equilibrium to exist is that matches between high-skill
workers and low-skill jobs are realized. This happens when 9
(1  ) (yL   c) > rUH : (30)
Denition 1 In Cross Skill Matching (CSM) steady-state equilibrium, the following
must hold:
(i) workersBellman equations (15), (16), (17), (18) and (19),
(ii) rmsBellman equations (20), (21), (22), (23) and (24),
(iii) Nash bargaining conditions (26), (27) and (28),
(iv) steady state conditions (8), (10), (11), and (12),
(v) free entry conditions (25),
(vi) government budget constraint (29) and
(vii) CSM equilibrium condition (30).10
We evaluate separately the unemployment rates of both types of workers, the low-
skill unemployment rate
uL =
u
q
and the high-skill unemployment rate
uH =
(1  )u
1  q :
In CSM steady-state equilibrium the aggregate level of output is 11
9Conditions JL(H) > VL andWL(H) > UH must hold. We can obtain the CSM equilibrium condition
by processing the corresponding Bellman equations.
10For the set of exogenous parameters fb; c; q; r; yL; yH;; ; ;m(); z()g the equlibrium
conditions determine the set of endogenous values

u; v; EL; EH ; JL; JH ; JL(H); UL; UH ; VL;
VH ;WL;WH ;WL(H); ; ;  ; 
	
:
11Each worker employed in a low-skill rm produces yL and each worker employed in a high-skill
rm produces yH .
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Y CSM = ELyL + EHyL + (1  )EHyH :
Given that we are interested in measuring welfare, we evaluate the expected lifetime
utility of the average low-skill worker, 
CSML ; and that of the average high-skill worker,

CSMH ; as follows

CSML =
ELWL + (q   EL)UL
q
;

CSMH =
EHWL(H) + (1  )EHWH + (1  q   EH)UH
1  q :
The overall welfare 
CSM is the weighted sum of the two,

CSM = ELWL + EHWL(H) + (1  )EHWH + (q   EL)UL + (1  q   EH)UH :
2.1.2 Ex Post Segmentation Equilibrium
Let us now describe the equilibrium equations when high-skill workers are only matching
with high-skill rms.
The probability that a low-skill worker will match with a low-skill rm does not
change, so eq. (11) still holds, but the probability of forming a match for a high-skill
worker is lower,  
pWH
EPS
= (1  )m(); (31)
as these workers do not apply to low-skill vacancies anymore. The implied unemploy-
ment rate and the fraction of low-skill vacancies are, respectively
uEPS =
 ( + q   2q)
 (1  ) [m() + 2] ; (32)
EPS =
(1  ) qm () +  (q   )
m () ( + q   2q) : (33)
The Bellman equations that characterize the employed workers are (15) and (16), and
the corresponding equations for unemployed workers are (18) and
rUH = b+ (1  )m() (WH   UH) : (34)
The Bellman equations for the active rm are (20) and (21), and for the inactive rm
12
are
rVL =  c+ z() (JL   VL) (35)
and (24).12 The zero vacancy condition (25) must also hold, and wages are determined
by (26) and (27). Furthermore, the government budget constraint becomes
ELwL + EHwH = ub: (36)
Finally, the condition for EPS equilibrium to exist is that high-skill workers are matching
only with high-skill jobs
(1  ) (yL   c)  rUH : (37)
Denition 2 In Ex Post Segmentation (EPS) steady-state equilibrium, the following
must hold:
(i) workersBellman equations (15), (16), (18) and (34),
(ii) rmsBellman equations (20), (21), (35) and (24),
(iii) Nash bargaining conditions (26) and (27),
(iv) steady state conditions (8), (10), (11) and (31),
(v) zero vacancy value conditions (25),
(vi) government budget constraint (36) and
(vii) EPS equilibrium condition (37).
Under the EPS steady-state equilibrium the aggregate level of output is
Y EPS = ELyL + EHyH
and the welfare equations of the average low-skill and high-skill workers, 
EPSL and

EPSH ; are

EPSL =
ELWL + (q   EL)UL
q
; and

EPSH =
EHWH + (1  q   EH)UH
1  q :
The overall welfare 
EPS is the weighted sum of the two, as before

EPS = ELWL + EHWH + (q   EL)UL + (1  q   EH)UH :
12Notice that equations (34) and (35) now show that high-skill unemployed workers are only taking
high-skill jobs, and low-skill rms are ony hiring low-skill workers.
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3 Solving the model
The model can be solved numerically. In order to do so we need to specify the matching
function. We assume that M(u; v) = 2
p
uv; which implies
m() = 2
p
 and (38)
z() =
2p

: (39)
Using the Bellman equations for the expected lifetime utility of a vacant rm, (23)
and (24) for the CSM equilibrium, and (35) and (24) for the EPS equilibrium, and the
free entry condition (25), we obtain the following
when VL = 0; c = z()

JL + (1  )JL(H)

; (40)
when VH = 0; c = z()(1  )JH (41)
for the CSM equilibrium, and
when VL = 0; c = z()JL; (42)
when VH = 0; c = z()(1  )JH (43)
for the EPS equilibrium. Combining all the corresponding equilibrium equations we
obtain the combinations of  and ; or  = fVL=0(); for which (40) or (42) hold, and
the combinations of  and ; or  = fVH=0(); for which (41) or (43) hold too. In
general, for  2 (0; 1);  = fVL=0() is increasing and  = fVH=0() is decreasing. The
intersection of the two loci determines the fraction of low-skill unemployed  and the
market tightness . Once these two values are known, the solution of the model can be
obtained using the corresponding equilibrium conditions.13
4 Calibration and comparative statics
In the o¤shoring literature o¤shoring is often identied as a source of skill-biased tech-
nical change. In our setting, skill-biased technical change can be seen as an increase of
output produced in high-skill jobs while the output of low-skill jobs remains constant.
Similarly, this can also be represented as a fall in the productivity levels of low-skill
workers while keeping the productivity of high-skill workers xed. Hence, introducing
cheap imports due to a liberalization process or the increase of o¤shoring will reduce
13More details about the calculations of the equilibrium loci can be found in the Appendix.
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the value of the output of low-skill jobs.14
In this section we calibrate our model to the German economy during 20002014. We
use the following baseline parameters: the rate at which the employment relationship
is broken is  = 0:09; meaning that jobs last on average 11 years; agents discount the
future at a constant rate r = 0:023; which corresponds to the average real interest rate
in the data; there are q = 0:745 low-skill workers in the labor force (the average value of
workers with below upper secondary and secondary education in 2000 and 2011); and
the bargaining power of workers is the same as that of the rms,  = 0:5; so the Hocios
condition holds:
Further, the output produced by high-skill workers in a high-skill rm is assumed
to be yH = 1:2: The value of the output in a low-skill rm will change in order to
generate a CSM or an EPS equilibrium.15 We choose an output gap of 20 percent for
the calibration of the parameters. Thus, the baseline productivity of low-skill workers
is yL = 1:
Unemployment benets in Germany amount to around 63 percent of previously
perceived wages the parameter b that leads to such a value is b = 0:5: Moreover, the
cost of opening a vacancy is set at c = 0:25; implying an equilibrium unemployment
rate of 8 percent, which is roughly equal to the average value found in the data. When
simulating the e¤ects of o¤shoring, we open the productivity gap between high and
low-skill workers and aim to destroy15 percent of the low-skill vacancies :
4.1 E¤ects of o¤shoring
We carry out a comparative statics exercise to account for di¤erent policy measures
that can possibly compensate for the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring. The purpose of this
exercise is to theoretically examine the e¤ects of o¤shoring on the whole economy and
on low-skill workers in particular.
We describe three possible scenarios: (i) the movement from a CSM equilibrium to
another CSM; (ii) a switch from a CSM equilibrium to an EPS equilibrium; and (iii)
the movement from an EPS equilibrium to another EPS. Notice that in the cases (i)
and (ii) we might end up with a set of parameters where both equilibria are possible,
and where the actual outcome depends on the expectations of high-skill workers about
the economy and their willingness to accept, or not, a low-skill job.
Let us now preview the general initial e¤ects of o¤shoring in our model that is,
prior to any compensating policy measure. As seen in Tables 1 and 2, a reduction in
14Remember that o¤shoring intensity can be measured as an intermediate imports ratio as we did
above.
15Notice that the EPS equilibrium is more likely to exist when the productivity gap between the
two types of workers is high, i.e. when yH >> yL; and consequently the wages in low-skill rms are
too low to entice high-skill workers into these jobs.
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the productivity of low-skill workers yields the following qualitative results: 1) it raises
the overall and low-skill unemployment rates, u and uL; 2) it reduces the fraction of
vacancies that are low-skill, ; 3) it brings down the wages in low-skill jobs, wL and
wL(H); 4) it cuts production down, Y ; and 5) it reduces overall and low-skillwelfare,

 and 
L (Table 2).
Table 1: Employment and wage e¤ects of o¤shoring
unemployment wages
CSM equilibrium yL u uL uH  wL wL(H) wH Y
Baseline (CSM) 1.1 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.95 0.834 0.837 0.887 1.057
O¤shoring (CSM) 1.072 0.048 0.050 0.041 0.81 0.804 0.818 0.882 1.027
O¤shoring (EPS) 1.072 0.070 0.067 0.079 0.55 0.800   0.912 1.027
unemployment wages
EPS equilibrium yL u uL uH  wL wL(H) wH Y
Baseline (EPS) 1.00 0.079 0.080 0.077 0.490 0.730   0.913 0.968
O¤shoring (EPS) 0.94 0.095 0.102 0.075 0.416 0.673   0.915 0.912
Note: O¤shoring is represented by a decrease in the productivity of low-skill workers yL that generates a 15% drop
in the share of low-skill vacancies .
Note that the changes in the unemployment rate, wages and welfare of high-skill
workers depend on the kind of equilibrium they all worsen under CSM but improve
when switching to EPS.
We now proceed to analyze three comparative statics exercises, involving appreciably
di¤erent policy measures with quite di¤erent outcomes a change of the unemployment
benets, a reduction of the vacancy costs, and the skill upgrading of low-skill workers.
Table 2: Welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring
CSM equilibrium 
 
L 
H
Baseline (CSM) 34.83 34.77 35.02
O¤shoring (CSM) 33.57 33.26 34.44
O¤shoring (EPS) 33.46 32.40 36.56
EPS equilibrium 
 
L 
H
Baseline (EPS) 31.10 29.32 36.29
O¤shoring (EPS) 28.97 26.62 35.81
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4.1.1 Policy 1: Unemployment Benets
It is a well-known fact that an increase in the unemployment benets b increases the
reservation wage of workers and thus obliges rms to pay them more. Naturally, this
has a positive a¤ect on the workers utility but, on the other hand, it also induces
workers to remain idle. Besides, to nance the increase of b taxes need to be raised,
thus reducing the workersnet income. As a result, a negative e¤ect of taxes can prevail.
Conversely, lowering b increases the net wages of both types of workers, even when this
increase will not be enough to compensate for the decrease in utility experimented by
the o¤shoring-related displaced workers.
Figure 2 summarizes the results, for both the equilibria discussed, of our calibration
on the welfare of low-skill workers using German data. We conclude that changing
the level of unemployment benets to higher or lower levels (horizontal axes in Figure
2) turns out to be ine¤ective for compensating workers for the loss of welfare due to
o¤shoring leaving a permanent welfare gapbetween the original equilibrium (bold
point in Figure 2) and the o¤shoring equilibria(depicted by the continuous and dotted
lines in Figure 2).16
Figure 2: Unemployment benets under di¤erent equilibria
CSM, baseline EPS, baseline
Figure 3 adds some color to our previous exercise and shows how active governments
have been for the last 15 years in relation to labor market policies in general. Unlike in
other countries, Germany has committed itself to a substantial reduction in its active
and passive policy measures. According to OECD data, German public expenditure
involving active and passive measures has fallen more than 1 percentage point of GDP
during that period. This, however, would fall short of a complete recovery in terms of
the welfare of low-skill workers, as previously seen in Figure 2. Let us now turn our
attention to our second policy alternative: an increase in labor market exibility.
16The welfare e¤ect of o¤shoring in Figures 2 and 4 is the vertical drop from the bold dot to the
lines below; then moving along the lines in either direction results in the compensating mechanism.
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Figure 3: Labor market policies spending, % of GDP
Source: OECD Labour Market Programmes Dataset (2013). Notes: public expenditures
on both active and passive measures; data for Italy 9599 were not available.
4.1.2 Policy 2: Labor market exibility
Let us discuss the e¤ects of the exibilization of the labor market by way of a reduction
of the vacancy costs c. A fall of yL due to o¤shoring that is, one that generates a
15 percent drop in the share of low-skill vacancies () as assumed earlier results in a
welfare loss that can be completely o¤set by a cutback of the vacancy costs.17
As in the previous exercise, we are interested in a compensating mechanism that
would bring the welfare of the low-skill group back to its pre-o¤shoring level. As seen
in Figure 4, this can be achieved by allowing for a reduction in the vacancy costs in
terms of the gures this is accomplished when the lines intersect the value given by the
vertical axes at which the original equilibria stand (bold dots). The size of the cutback
depends on the equilibria involved and range from 13 percent in the CSMCSM case
(continuous line left panel), to 19 and 20 percent when CSMEPS (dotted line left
panel) and EPSEPS (right panel) respectively.
Flexibilization encourages hiring and this, in our setting, would drive wages up. The
raise would be extensive to both low and high-skill workers yet, the truth be told, it
would fall more largely on the latter. Regardless, welfare in general is increased as a
result of exibilization and the welfare of low-skill workers in particular can be brought
back to pre-o¤shoring levels.18
17See Tables 1 and 2 above for the quantitative e¤ects of o¤shoring in terms of employment, wages,
and welfare.
18We have a sizable amount of data from our calibrations that is available on request. The main
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Figure 4: Flexibilization under di¤erent equilibria
CSM, baseline EPS, baseline
Figure 5 shows the changes in the level of employment protection for the same
group of countries as in the previous sections. We can see that employment protection
has generally moved toward less exibility in recent years, with Germany in particular
moving slightly but consistently on the higher end something which is clearly at odds
with mitigating the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring.
Figure 5: Employment protection, strictness indicator
Source: OECD Employment Protection Dataset (2013).
Notes: OECD indicator (v.1) of regulations on dismissals and use of temporary contracts.
Notice that even when c in our model simply refers to the cost of creating and
maintaining a vacancy, it is still accounted for in the OECD strictness indicator as this
point for us, however, was to show that the policy presented here seems to be achievable and within
the reach of most policy makers.
19
includes both the regulations on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts the lat-
ter having a direct impact on the hiring process of rms. Vacancy costs usually include
advertisement, the time cost of the internal recruiter, the time cost taken by the inter-
views, drugs screens and background checks, and various pre-employment assessment
tests.
As for the indicator presented here, a reduction of the vacancy cost may be brought
about by loosening up the regulations involving temporary workers, as this will probably
reduce the administrative burden faced by the rms. Likewise, employment subsidies
seem bound to have the same e¤ect on hiring (Phelps, 1994), this time at the expense of
the taxpayer or lower welfare entitlements. Finally, it can be argued too that reducing
the ring costs can bring c down as this can be broadly thought of as including the
costs which rms will have to face sooner or later. Labor market policies can strongly
dene the pattern of trade and the e¤ects of trade in general (see Helpman and Itskhoki,
2007), and o¤shoring is just another form of trade.19
4.1.3 Addendum: Upgrading of low-skill workers
Skill upgrading can be understood as a change in relative wages, favoring the high-skill,
reecting a change in productivity levels.20 An expected outcome of o¤shoring involves
the recycling and upgrading of those low-skill workers who have lost their jobs. To
be sure, once those low-skill jobs have been relocated, rms will have more room for
new goods and services that will be produced with new technologies using higher skill
requirements. Workers who are able to seize the opportunity by getting trained in new
skills and thus by becoming high-skill workers will eventually command higher wages.
Here we pose a very simple question. Assuming that the o¤shoring threat will make
low-skill workers seek to change their status to high-skill, then how much of a drop in
the share of low-skill workers q will be needed to compensate for the welfare loss of
o¤shoring?21 Given that low-skill workers are now able to move up the skill ladder our
policy goal will be total welfare (
). The workers that remain low-skill, however, will
still bear considerable welfare losses. Table 3 presents the results of our calibration for
Germany, in a similar way as we did before.
19Davidson and Matusz (2006) evaluate the e¤ects of four di¤erent policies in the broader context
of globalization: unemployment benets, training subsidies, employment or wage subsidies. They con-
clude that wage subsidies are the preferred policy as they give the highest incentive for re-employment.
20Empirical evidence on this subject abounds; see, among several others, Berman et al. (1994) and
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for the US, Geishecker and Görg (2005) for Germany, Head and Ries
(2002) for Japan, and Hijzen et al. (2005) for the UK. On the theoretical side see for instance Fang et
al. (2008) and Anwar and Rice (2009), among others.
21Notice that high-skill workers, even when in low-skill occupations, can still command higher wages
than low-skill workers, or wL(H) > wL. Be also aware that the mechanism by which workers react to
o¤shoring by improving their skills is considered exogenous.
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Table 3: O¤shoring, skill upgrading and welfare
CSM equilibrium yL q  
 
L 
H
Baseline (CSM) 1.1 0.745 0.95 34.83 34.77 35.02
O¤shoring (CSM) 1.072 0.745 0.81 33.57 33.26 34.44
Skill upgrading* 1.072 0.715 0.74 33.56 33.10 34.70
O¤shoring (EPS) 1.072 0.745 0.55 33.46 32.40 36.56
Skill upgrading 1.072 0.485 0.36 34.84 31.96 37.53
EPS equilibrium yL q  
 
L 
H
Baseline (EPS) 1.00 0.745 0.490 31.10 29.32 36.29
O¤shoring (EPS) 0.94 0.745 0.416 28.97 26.62 35.81
Skill upgrading 0.94 0.545 0.284 31.10 26.48 36.64
* CSM equilibrium does not exist for lower levels of the low-skill share q.
Note: O¤shoring is, as before, assumed to be equal to a drop in the productivity of
low-skill workers yL that generates a 15% drop in the share of low-skill vacancies :
The uppermost segment of the table shows that the economy remains at a CSM
equilibrium as long as q  0:715; and that lower levels of q lead to a switch CSMEPS.
Notice that only when switching into the EPS equilibrium the pre-o¤shoring level of
welfare can be achieved this is seen on the second segment of the upper panel and on
the bottom panel under skill upgrading. Respectively, the share of low-skill workers q
needs to go down to around 49 (CSMEPS) and 55 percent (EPSEPS) to get back to
the initial welfare level.
Figure 6 shows a clear trend pointing in the direction of skill upgrading of low-
skill workers since the early 2000s. Seemingly, people are fast adapting to the ever
increasing requirements of globalized rms by acquiring more skills by way of higher
levels of education. In the particular case of Germany, special concern should be placed
on the still high share of relatively low to mid-skill segments of the population the
second highest in the sample as of 2011.
It can be argued that in the lack of a consensus from the majority of the politi-
cal forces to e¤ect one of the two alternatives previously discussed, there is still the
possibility of upgrading for those at the bottom of the skill ladder. This, as we can
see, will likely bring welfare to pre-o¤shoring levels. Of course, this upgrading can also
be encouraged by a combination of policies aimed at the re-employment of dismissed
workers (see, among others, Phelps, 1994, Davidson and Matusz, 2006, and Jung and
Mercenier, 2014).
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Figure 6: Education attained (25-64 year-olds, %)
Source: OECD Education GPS, Chapter A (2012).
Notes: low is below upper secondary level, mid is secondary and post-secondary, and high is tertiary.
5 Conclusions
We have relied on a matching model to perform a quantitative analysis of the e¤ects of
low-skill o¤shoring on the welfare of the economy. We have adapted and extended the
model by Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to assess the e¤ect of two government policies:
unemployment benets and labor market exibilization.
We have shown that, in the case of Germany, the welfare loss due to low-skill o¤-
shoring can be compensated by a exibilization policy it would only take a relatively
small reduction in the vacancy cost to achieve the pre-o¤shoring welfare levels. Un-
employment benets, on the other hand, cannot compensate for the negative welfare
e¤ects of o¤shoring as the positive e¤ects of higher benets is o¤set by the negative
e¤ect of its nancing. Thus, the recommended welfare improving tool is exibilization,
which also implies work incentives and an increase in economic activity.
Furthermore, an additional exercise reveals that if low-skill workers adjust them-
selves to higher skill requirements (upgrading) the welfare loss can also be compen-
sated. These adjustments vary widely and depend on the equilibria involved, and could
be encouraged by re-employment and re-training programs as discussed in the text.
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Appendix
Solution of the model: Cross Skill Matching Equilibrium
Taking into account (25) and rewriting (20), (21) and (22) we get
JL =
yL   wL   c
r + 
; (44)
JH =
yH   wH   c
r + 
; (45)
JL(H) =
yL   wL(H)   c
r + 
: (46)
Using (18) and (19) in combination with (26)-(28) and (15)-(17) we can write
rUL =
b (r + ) + m() (1  ) (yL   c)
r +  + m()
; (47)
rUH =
b (r + ) + m() (1  ) [yL + (1  ) yH   c]
r +  +m()
: (48)
Plugging (44), (46), (26), (28), (47), (39), (14) and (38) into (40) we get the combination
of  and  for which the free entry condition for low-skill workers holds,  = fVL=0()
VL = 0 locus: 0 =   c (r + )
p
L + 2 (1  ) (yL   c)
 2 (1  ) b (r + )
(1  )


r +  + 2
p
L
+
1  
r +  + 2
p
L

 4 (1  ) 
p
L

 (yL   c)
r +  + 2
p
L
+
(1  ) [yL + (1  ) yH   c]
r +  + 2
p
L

where  = 
 p
L

is given in (14). It is a third degree polynomial in
p
L: Given that
b; c; q; r; yL; ;  and  are predetermined, this polynomial gives us the value of
p
L for
a given . We solve it numerically. Plugging (45), (27), (48), (39), (14) and (38) into
(41) we get the combination of  and  for which the free entry condition for high-skill
workers holds,  = fVH=0()
VH = 0 locus: 0 = H 2c (r + )  (1  ) +p
H
n
c (r + )2 (1  )  4(1  ) (1  )  (1  ) q(1 )
(1 q) (yH   yL)
o
 2(1  ) (1  ) (yH   yL)  (1  ) (q )(1 q)
 2(1  ) (1  ) [(1  ) (yH   c)  b] (r + ) :
This locus is a second degree polynomial in
p
H : An analytical solution is applied.
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Solution of the model: Ex Post Segmentation Equilibrium
Taking into account (25) and rewriting (20) and (21) we get (44) and (45). Using
(18) and (19) in combination with (26), (27), (15) and (16) we get (47) and
rUH =
b (r + ) +  (1  )m() (1  ) (yH   c)
r +  + (1  )m() : (49)
Plugging (44), (26), (47), (39), (33) and (38) into (42) we get the combination of 
and  for which the free entry condition for low-skill workers holds,  = fVL=0()
VL = 0 locus: 0 = L 2c (1  )  q(1 )+q 2q +p
L
n
c (1  )  (q )
+q 2q + c (r + ) (1  )
o
 2 (1  ) [(1  ) (yL   c)  b] :
Plugging (45), (27), (49), (39), (33) and (38) into (43) we get the combination of  and
 for which the free entry condition for high-skill workers holds,  = fVH=0()
VH = 0 locus: 0 = H 2c (r + ) (1  )  (1 q)(+q 2q) +p
H
"
 c (r + ) (1  )  (q )
(+q 2q)
+c (r + )2 (1  )  4(1  ) (1  )  (yH   c)  (1 q)(+q 2q)
#
+
2(1  ) (1  )  (yH   c)  (q )(+q 2q)
 2(1  ) (1  ) (r + ) [(1  ) (yH   c)  b] :
We can see that both loci are second degree polynomials in
p
L and
p
H ; respectively.
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